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ABSTRACT
The  objective  of  this  study  is  to  establish  a  conceptual  model  of   perception   of   luck   and
empirically examine the relationships  between  intensity  of  luck  and  four  predictors  including
rarity, importance, exclusivity, and proximity in the context of a  casino  gaming.  Data  collection
will be conducted by surveying casino gamblers in Macao. Participants will be  asked  to  indicate
their responses to the constructs with reference  to  their  most  recent  casino  gaming  experience.
Multiple regression analysis will be employed  to  test  the  hypotheses.  The  findings  will  enrich
theoretical understanding of luck and provide implications to casino  marketers  on  how  to  shape
their patrons’ gambling behavior through manipulating the  determinants  of  perceived  degree  of
luck.
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INTRODUCTION
Luck is salient in gamblers’ mind (Keren & Wagenaar, 1985; Toneatto, 1999; Wagenaar &
Keren, 1988). Although luck has  widely  been  recognized  as  an  uncontrollable  factor  (Barrett,
2006;  Friedland,  1992;  Rescher,  1995;  Rotter,  1966;   Weiner,   1985),   many   gamblers   still
irrationally strive to control it in order to derive their desired outcomes (Keren & Wagenaar, 1985;
Latour,  Sarrazit,  Hendler,  &  Latour,  2009;  Toneatto,  1999;  Wagenaar  &  Keren,  1988).  The
underlying rationale for this irrational phenomenon can be addressed to gamblers’ failure to notify
that luck is actually driven by chance.  Gamblers  tend  to  consider  chance  and  luck  as  separate
factors.  In  a  prior  study  on  gamblers’  understanding  of  luck,  skill,  and  chance,  Keren   and
Wagenaar (1985) found that a majority of participants managed to differentiate  chance,  luck  and
skill, and only a few of them would  consider  chance  and  luck  being  indifferent.  According  to
Friedland (1998), chance-oriented people make a decision based on  odds,  whereas  luck-oriented
counterparts ignore odds in decision making. Given that odds are  uncontrollable,  they  contradict
with the human needs for personal control of outcome  (Averill,  1973;  Burger,  1987;  Burger  &
Vartabedian, 1980; Gebhardt  &  Brosschot,  2002;  Lefcourt,  1973).  As  predicted  by  reactance
theory  (Brehm,  1966),  it  is  not  surprising  for  gamblers  to  recoup  their  sense  of  control  by
believing that luck can influence the outcome. Indeed, Keren and Wagenaar (1985) examined  that
gamblers perceived luck as the most important factor accounting for gambling outcomes.
Gambling is defined as “the act of risking a sum of money on the  outcome  of  a  game  or
event that is determined by chance” (Loo, Raylu, & Oei, 2008). Gambling-related  businesses  and
activities are found in various forms including casino gaming, lottery,  sports  betting,  and  racing
betting. Casino gaming is one of the most lucrative forms of gambling-related business. In  Macao
and Las Vegas, the two largest casino gaming markets of the world, revenues generated  from  the
casino  sector  outperformed  those  from  other  forms  of  gambling-related   businesses   (Macao
Gaming Inspection and Coordination Bureau, 2011; Nevada  Gaming  Control  Board,  2011).  As
competition in non-monopolized casino gaming market is keen, practitioners have to  differentiate
themselves from  other  competitors  in  such  various  areas  as  customer  service,  environmental
design, atmosphere  and  others  to  attract  more  patrons  to  their  business  (Johnson,  Mayer,  &
Champaner, 2004; Liu & Wan, 2011; Mayer  &  Johnson,  2003;  Mayer,  Johnson,  Hu,  &  Chen,
1998; Richard, 1997). More importantly, casino marketers have  to  prolong  the  patrons’  staying
time, stimulate  more  gambling  activities  and  induce  higher  betting  amount.  Previous  studies
showed that feeling of good luck exerted positive impact on proclivity to take  risk  (i.e.  wagering
larger amount) (Jiang, Cho, & Adaval, 2009; Sierra & Hyman,  2009;  Wohl  &  Enzle,  2003).  In
this sense, successful manipulation of factors that influence  perception  of  luck  can  be  a  viable
approach for casino practitioners to shape their patrons’ gambling behavior, which in turn poses  a
positive impact on their revenues. Thus, determinants of luck  absolutely  deserve  more  attention
from researchers.
Luck plays a critical role in determining the outcome across aspects of people’s daily  lives
(Smith, Wiseman, Harris, & Joiner,  1996).  Despite  the  notion  of  luck  has  attracted  extensive
attentions  from  researchers  across  disciplines  like  philosophy   (Barrett,   2006;   Latus,   2003;
Pritchard & Smith, 2004;  Rescher,  1995),  psychology  (Andre,  2006,  2009;  Bersabe  &  Arias,
2000; Darke & Freedman, 1997a,  1997b;  Day  &  Maltby,  2003,  2005;  Friedland,  1992,  1998;
Friedland, Keinan, &  Regev,  1992;  Keren  &  Wagenaar,  1985;  Maltby,  Day,  Gill,  Colley,  &
Wood, 2008; Pritchard & Smith, 2004;  Smith,  et  al.,  1996;  Teigen,  1995,  1996,  1997,  1998a,
1998b, 2005; Teigen, Evensen, Samoilow, & Vatne, 1999; Wagenaar &  Keren,  1988;  Wiseman,
2003; Wohl & Enzle, 2002, 2003; Wohl,  Young,  &  Hart,  2007),  and  marketing  (Jiang,  et  al.,
2009; Prendergast & Thompson, 2008), it is interesting that no conceptual model has drawn in the
factors that affect perception of luck in the existing literature. To establish  a  concrete  foundation
for further studies on the notion of luck, it is imminent for researchers to integrate  the  essence  of
prior studies and develop a conceptual model.
Previous empirical researches on luck can be categorized into two major streams. The  first
stream revolves around general belief in luck and its relationships with personality,  psychological
well-being, and paranormal belief (Andre, 2006, 2009; Darke & Freedman, 1997a; Day & Maltby,
2003, 2005; Maltby, et al., 2008; Smith, et al., 1996; Wiseman, Harris, & Middleton, 1994;  Wohl
& Enzle, 2002; Wohl, et al.,  2007).  The  studies  in  the  second  stream  focus  on  the  affective,
cognitive, and behavioral consequences of perception of luck (Bersabe &  Arias,  2000;  Darke  &
Freedman, 1997b; Friedland, 1992, 1998; Friedland, et  al.,  1992;  Jiang,  et  al.,  2009;  Keren  &
Wagenaar, 1985; Prendergast & Thompson, 2008; Teigen, 1995, 1996, 1997, 1998a, 1998b, 2005;
Teigen, et al., 1999; Wagenaar & Keren, 1988; Wohl &  Enzle,  2003).  Although  the  underlying
factors of perception of luck have been  identified  by  philosophers  (Barrett,  2006;  Latus,  2003;
Pritchard & Smith, 2004; Rescher, 1995), no  relevantly  empirical  study  has  been  found  in  the
literature. It is imminent to fill in the research gap.
The objectives of this study are twofold. First, this study proposes a  conceptual  model  of
perception of luck through literature review and its discussions. Second, this  study  examines  the
relationships between intensity of luck and its predictors by surveying casino gamblers in Macao.
LITERATURE REVIEW
Uncontrollable Nature of Luck
In English speaking regions, the word “luck” firstly appeared in the fifteenth century (New
Oxford American dictionary, 2010; Rescher, 1995). Dictionaries commonly define luck as  chance
happening of positive and negative  events  (Cambridge  dictionary  of  American  English,  2008;
Collins  English  dictionary,  2009;  New  Oxford  American  dictionary,  2010;   Random   House
Webster’s  unabridged  dictionary,  2001;  The  American  Heritage   dictionary   of   the   English
language,  2006).  In  other  words,  luck  is  underscored  by  chance  and,   thus   should   not   be
controllable. This idea echoes with attribution theorists’ argument that luck is a random,  unstable,
and uncontrollable variable  (Feather,  1969;  Feather  &  Simon,  1971;  Levenson,  1973;  Rotter,
1966;  Weiner,  et  al.,  1971).  According  to  the  classical  attribution  theory,  namely  “locus  of
control” (Levenson, 1973; Rotter, 1966), some people tend to attribute an event  to  their  capacity
and behavior (i.e., internal locus of control); whilst others prefer attributing the  event  to  external
forces such as luck, fate  or  powerful  others  (i.e.,  external  locus  of  control).  Internal  locus  of
control is, or is believed to be, controllable and external locus of control is,  or  is  believed  to  be,
uncontrollable. In this sense, luck is inherently uncontrollable in attribution process.
Outcome Valence (Positive versus Negative) as a Predictor of Luck Valence (Good versus Bad)
People evaluate outcome by comparing it  with  subjective  standard  level  (Helson,  1948;
Thibaut & Kelley, 1959). In a similar vein, Kahneman and Miller’s (1986) norm theory posits that
an outcome would trigger normative alternatives, which in  turn  serves  as  a  reference  point  for
people to make a comparison. A reference point refers to the stimulus that “other stimuli  are  seen
in relation to” (Rosch, 1975, p. 532). Formation of reference points rests on expectations, personal
desirability, available information, and past experiences  (Klein  &  Oglethorpe,  1987;  Woodruff,
Clemons, Schumann, Gardial, & Burns, 1991). Thus, reference points  among  individuals  can  be
highly divergent, which in turn results in contrasting evaluations  of  the  same  outcome  (Peeters,
1991). For instance, winning a hundred dollars can be very exciting for a gambler whose reference
point is not to lose; whilst the same  outcome  can  be  disappointing  for  another  gambler  whose
reference point is to win a larger amount.
Boles and Messick (1995) integrated norm theory and regret theory  to  discuss  the  notion
of a reference point. As mentioned earlier, norm theory assumes  that  an  outcome  would  trigger
normative alternative, which in turn serves as a reference point for people to make  a  comparison.
Regret theory was developed from the traditional economic theory on a  utility  by  arguing  that  a
utility of an outcome also includes the difference between the  factual  outcome  and  the  outcome
that would have been derived if the alternative option had  been  chosen  (Bell,  1982;  Loomes  &
Sugden, 1982; Sage & White, 1983; Zeelenberg &  Van  Dijk,  2005).  Given  these  two  theories,
Boles and Messick (1995) posited that evaluation of outcomes is based  on  two  reference  points:
the status quo and an evoked alternative outcome. The first reference point is the evaluation of the
current outcome or the status quo,  which  determines  valence  of  the  outcome  (i.e.,  positive  or
negative). The second reference point is the evaluation of the outcome with respect to the outcome
that could be resulted if the other option had been  chosen  or  an  evoked  alternative  outcome.  A
winning  outcome  (the  first  reference  point)  should  elicit  positive  emotion.  However,  if   the
outcome is further compared with a better  outcome  provided  by  alternative  option  (the  second
reference point), the winner will feel regretful over his/her decision. Likewise, the loser  may  feel
disappointed at the first reference point, but feel elated at the second reference point if  the  factual
losing outcome is better than the alternative losing outcome.
Boles and Messick (1995) tested this proposition with an experimental design by exposing
participants to four gambling situations as shown in Table 1.
Table 1 – Evaluation of a gambling situation with the reference points
|           |1st reference   |Evaluatio|2nd reference point |Evaluation|
|           |point           |n        |(An evoked          |          |
|           |(The status quo)|         |alternative outcome)|          |
|Situation A|Winning $100    |+        |Winning $500        |-         |
|Situation B|Losing $0       |-        |Losing $100         |+         |
|Situation C|Winning $500    |+        |Winning $100        |+         |
|Situation D|Losing $100     |-        |Losing $0           |-         |
Source. Adapted from Boles and Messick (1995). The + sign refers to a positive evaluation. The –
sign refers to a negative evaluation.
Based on the proposition of the two reference  points,  participants  in  Situation  A  would
have a positive evaluation relative to the status quo and a negative evaluation when they compared
it with the alternative outcome (winning $500). Participants in Situation B would have  a  negative
evaluation relative to  status  quo  and  a  positive  evaluation  relative  to  its  alternative  outcome
(losing nothing is better than  losing  $100).  In  contrast,  participants  in  Situation  C  would  not
encounter the evaluation conflicts that arose to Situation A. Participants in Situation C would have
a positive evaluation relative to status quo (winning $500) and an additionally positive  evaluation
relative to Situation A  (winning  $500  is  superior  to  winning  $100).  Likewise,  participants  in
Situation D would have negative evaluation relative to status quo (losing $100) and  an  additional
negative evaluation relative to Situation  B  (losing  $100  is  inferior  to  losing  nothing).  Results
showed that the feeling of being regretful was strongest in Situation D, followed  by  Situation  A,
Situation B,  and  Situation  C  (Boles  &  Messick,  1995).  An  evaluation  conflict  occurs  when
evaluation of an outcome at the first reference point is different from that at  the  second  reference
point. Narrowing down the analysis to the two outcomes where evaluation conflicts were  incurred
(Situations A and B), Boles and Messick (1995) found that winners even felt  more  regretful  over
their decisions than the losers.
As illustrated in the above experiment, evaluation of outcome may require two  steps  (i.e.,
two reference points). In this regard, perception of luck elicited  from  evaluation  on  an  outcome
may also involve comparisons with two reference points. In Teigen’s  (1998a)  study,  participants
survived in hazardous event indicated co-existence of both bad and good luck. This finding  is  not
surprising because people suffering from hazardous  situations  (the  first  reference  point)  would
feel unlucky while the  fact  that  they  escaped  from  death  (the  second  reference  point)  would
trigger feeling of good luck. Likewise, in a gambling context, a casino gambler who lost a bet (the
first reference point) would feel unlucky but may feel a little lucky if the amount is  much  smaller
than that in the previous gambling experience (the second reference point). However, the  final  or
overall  evaluation  of  the  gambling  experience  would  be  unknown  without  a  comparison  of
evaluation between the first reference point and the second reference point. That  is,  if  a  gambler
feels lucky in a lost bet case, it would be because lucky feeling in the second evaluation outweighs
unlucky feeling in the first evaluation. However, such a situation should be relatively rare as it has
been  consistently  assumed  that  good  luck  followed  wins;  whilst  bad   luck   followed   losses
(Friedland, 1998; Pritchard & Smith, 2004; Teigen, 2005; Wagenaar &  Keren,  1988).  Therefore,
outcome valence should generally be positively associated with luck valence.
Determinants of the Intensity of Luck
Literature review indicates that perception of luck commonly consists of two  components:
valence and intensity of luck. Figure 1  exhibits  a  conceptual  model  of  perception  of  luck.  As
discussed earlier, outcome valence should be positively associated with luck valence. With respect
to  intensity  of  luck,  this   study   proposes   four   determinants   including   rarity,   importance,
exclusivity, and proximity. The discussions in this section will focus on those determinants.
Figure 1 – Conceptual Model of Perception of Luck
Rarity
Pritchard and Smith (2004) argued, from a philosophical point  of  view,  that  an  event  is
lucky when the actual world does not occur in most of the nearby possible worlds. To illustrate,  a
lottery winner would feel lucky because the numbers that  he/she  chose  (the  actual  world)  were
drawn out  but  not  other  numbers  (nearby  possible  worlds).  Conversely,  people  who  see  the
sunrise in every morning would not feel lucky for seeing the sunrise since it is a  common  natural
phenomenon and also occurs in many other  places.  In  this  sense,  as  noted  by  Karabenick  and
Addy (1979), the notion of luck can be captured by rarity of an event. A lottery winner feels lucky
because there is a low chance to win, whereas seeing the sunrise is not a matter of luck since it is a
common phenomenon to them. Given the assumption that  rarity  determines  luck,  the  degree  of
luck would be driven by the rarity level of  an  event.  As  suggested  by  Rescher  (1995),  luck  is
inversely related to the likelihood of an event. Moreover, Pritchard and Smith  (2004)  argued  that
“extremely unusual events can be regarded as luckier than just plain  unusual  events”  (p.17).  For
example, someone dropped a wallet in a street and happened  to  find  it  without  losing  anything
inside a year later should feel luckier than in the case that he/she happened to find it  the  next  day
(Pritchard & Smith, 2004). In other words, the rarer the chance that an event  occurs  is,  the  more
intense the feeling of luck would be.
Probability is a means to explain chance (Batanero,  Henry,  &  Parzysz,  2005).  Hence,  a
rare event is one that has a low probability  to  happen.  Probability  can  be  categorized  into  two
types: objective and subjective. Objective probability is the value based on the laws of  probability
calculus, whereas subjective probability is an estimation of  probability  by  a  subject  or  inferred
from his/her behavior (Kahneman &  Tversky,  1972).  Subjective  probabilities  rest  on  people’s
feelings and vividness of imagination (Miller  &  Taylor,  2002).  Thus,  the  relationship  between
objective and subjective probabilities is nonlinear (Hong, 1983; Machina,  1982;  Quiggin,  1982).
Subjective probability plays a more important role in daily lives  than  objective  probability  since
people  tend  not  to  follow  probability  theory  to  judge  uncertain  events,  but   rather   rely   on
availability  heuristic  (Defabbro,  2004;  Schwarz,  et  al.,  1991;  Tversky  &  Kahneman,   1974).
Availability heuristic refers to estimation of the likelihood of an  event  “by  the  ease  with  which
instances or associations come to mind” (Tversky & Kahneman, 1973, p.  208).  This  heuristic  is
salient when the event (1) occurred more frequently in the past; (2) happened more recently, (3) is
more salient emotionally,  and  so  forth  (Tversky  &  Kahneman,  1974).  For  instance,  a  casino
gambler  will  evaluate  that  losing  a  thousand  dollars  is  not  a  rare  event  if  (1)  it  frequently
happened in the past; (2) the most recent gambling experience was also a losing case; and  (3)  the
gamble  had  lost  a  much  larger  amount  in  the  past.  In  this  sense,  within  the  framework  of
availability heuristic, previous experiences work as  reference  points  for  people  to  evaluate  the
outcomes (Boulding, Kalra,  Staelin,  &  Zeithaml,  1993;  Cadotte,  Woodruff,  &  Jenkins,  1987;
Woodruff, Cadotte, & Jenkins, 1983). Even a prior experience does not  exist;  people  would  still
form a reference point by anticipating the outcome (McGill & Iacobucci, 1992; Oliver & Bearden,
1985; Shirai & Meyer, 1997; Swan, 1977). Accordingly, the level of  rarity  is  determined  by  the
contrasting process between a  factual  outcome  and  a  reference  point  whereby  the  farther  the
outcome from the reference point is, the rarer the outcome would be.
Representativeness heuristic has been suggested as  a  cognitive  function  that  influences
subjective probability (Kahneman  &  Tversky,  1972).  A  typical  representativeness  heuristic  is
people’s belief in the law of small numbers (Tversky & Kahneman,  1971).  With  this  belief,  for
instance, when people are asked to produce a series of coin tosses, they are more likely to produce
sequences with alternative patterns (e.g. HHT, THH) than homogenous patterns (e.g. HHH,  TTT)
(Tune, 1964). This experiment implicates that people tend to believe homogenous patterns are less
likely than alternative ones (Kahneman & Tversky, 1972). In this sense, a rare occasion  might  be
predicted by homogenous patterns of outcomes.
In  general,  this  study  proposes  that  perceived  rarity  of  the  casino   gaming   outcome
positively predicts perception of luck (Proposition 1).
Importance
Rescher (1995) argued that importance of an event  determines  whether  it  is  a  matter  of
luck. Consistent with this argument, Pritchard and Smith (2004) stated that a lucky outcome is one
that is significant to the agent (or the casino gambler) concerned. Importance refers to the  benefits
and negativities received (Rescher, 1995). In gambling situations, the magnitude of monetary gain
and loss is the determinant of importance which in turn affects perception of luck  (Teigen,  1983).
The  subjective  judgment  on   importance   of   monetary   outcome   varies   with   the   financial
background of gamblers (Keren &  Wagenaar,  1988;  Walker,  1992).  For  examples,  winning  a
hundred thousand dollars would be highly significant from recreational gamblers’ perspective, but
may render little meaning to professional gamblers.
As importance is posited as a determinant of luck, the intensity of luck should be driven by
the importance level of the outcome. This argument echoes  with  Teigen’s  (1998a)  findings.  He
found that feeling of good luck is stronger than bad luck in dangerous and careless incidents  since
a much worse outcome was avoided. More importantly, his  study  revealed  that  the  intensity  of
good luck is stronger in dangerous than in careless incidents since the former could  lead  to  more
serious  adversities  (Teigen,  1998a).  In  this  sense,  the  more  significant  the   outcome   to   an
individual’s personal well-being is, the higher the intensity of luck would be triggered. Thus,  it  is
not surprising that a gambler winning a million dollars is luckier than winning a  thousand  dollars
(Latus, 2003). Although this example appears inarguable, the simple comparison  of  the  amounts
fails to capture the subjective aspect of importance (Bloch & Richins, 1983). For instance, from  a
billionaire’s point of view, the subjective  difference  between  a  million  dollars  and  a  thousand
dollars may be so insignificant that  a  million  dollars  may  not  exert  much  stronger  impact  on
intensity of luck than a thousand dollars.
On the other hand, researchers argued that  importance  varies  with  motives  (Howard  &
Sheth, 1969).  Accordingly,  importance  in  gambling  context  should  be  relevant  to  gamblers’
motives  such  as  winning,  amusement,  excitement,  socialization,  and  alleviation  of   negative
emotions. Among various types of motives, winning has consistently  been  revealed  as  the  most
important one (Lee, Chae, Lee, & Kim,  2007;  Lee,  Lee,  Bernhard,  &  Yoon,  2006;  Neighbors,
Lostutter,  Cronce,  &  Larimer,  2002;  Platz  &  Millar,  2001;  Walker,  1992).  Thus,   gambling
outcome should be the most crucial determinant of perceived importance which in turn  influences
perception  of  luck.  However,  other  researchers  posited  that  winning  might  not  be  the  most
important motive for gambling. Loroz (2004) and Lam (2007)  found  that  a  hedonic  reason  like
pleasure is perceived as the most prominent motive. In another study, Aasved  (2003)  argued  that
socialization is more important than monetary gain. As a result,  compared  to  those  who  gamble
for a monetary reason, gamblers who consider loss of money as  the  price  of  entertainment  may
not be sensitive to luck (Brenner & Brenner, 1990; Cotte, 1997).
According to the theoretical model on product importance proposed by Bloch and  Richins
(1983), there are two types of  importance:  instrumental  and  enduring.  Instrumental  importance
refers to the perception of importance based on people’s desire  to  attain  the  extrinsic  objectives
that may obtain from the outcome. In contrast, enduring importance  rests  on  the  extent  that  the
outcome is relative to  the  intrinsic  goals.  The  model  sheds  some  light  on  the  importance  of
winning in gambling context. Within the framework of instrumental  importance,  some  gamblers
stress winning to  resolve  their  financial  difficulties  (Brenner  &  Brenner,  1990);  whilst  other
gamblers harness the monetary gain to satisfy their materialistic needs (Lee, et al., 2007). In terms
of enduring importance, some gamblers need winning to feel  joyful,  to  protect  their  self-esteem
(Cotte, 1997), or to prove that they are in a run of good luck. Although these two concepts  appear
to be independent, their co-occurrence is also plausible (Bloch & Richins, 1983).  For  instance,  a
gambler winning a huge amount does not only fulfill his materialistic  needs  (extrinsic  goal),  but
also  allows  him  to  show  off  in  front  of  other  people  (internal  goal).  In  general,   perceived
importance of outcome rests on the extent that the desired goals (extrinsic, intrinsic or  both)  have
been achieved.
Given the above discussions, this study proposes that perceived importance  of  the  casino
gaming outcome positively predicts perception of luck (Proposition 2).
Exclusivity
In the literature of philosophy, perception of luck has been advocated as a  consequence  of
social comparison. Barrett (2006) and Latus (2003) argued that good luck of  an  individual  is  the
bad luck of the others. Consistent with this, there were researches purporting that an  individual  is
lucky  when  chance  favors  him/her  but  not  the  others  (Darke  &   Freedman,   1997a;   Smith,
Wiseman, Machin, Harris, & Joiner, 1997). Moreover, Teigen (1997) concluded his study with the
notion that “the term luck typically prompted the  idea  of  self-other  comparisons”  (p.  322).  All
these arguments imply that perception of luck is predicted by exclusivity of an outcome.
In this study, exclusivity is described as the situation that  an  outcome  is  dedicated  to  a
relatively small  number  of  individuals  or  a  specific  individual.  It  is  proposed  that  perceived
exclusivity varies with perception of luck in a positive manner. While the proposition  is  plausible,
exclusivity may not be applicable across situations. A major reason is  that  lucky  experiences  do
not always require unlucky  counterparts.  For  instance,  a  gambler  winning  a  thousand  dollars
would feel lucky even though he is not aware of others’ outcomes.  Therefore,  different  from  the
constructs of rarity  and  importance  discussed  earlier,  exclusivity  requires  a  precondition  (i.e.
availability of other people’s outcomes in similar  scenario  for  social  comparison).  However,  in
many cases, individuals  do  not  have  access  to  other  people’s  outcome  (Van  den  Bos,  Lind,
Vermunt, & Wilke, 1997) and, thus the social comparison process is always impeded.
Festinger (1954) was the first researcher who conceptualized social comparison.  Over  the
years, his framework has remained the most influential work  in  the  corresponding  domain.  The
social  comparison  theory  posits  that  people  have  a  strong  drive  toward   social   comparison
(Kruglanski & Mayseless, 1990). This postulation is especially  legitimate  within  the  domain  of
social justice where social comparison serves as a means for people to evaluate the fairness of  the
outcomes which in turn affects their satisfaction (Messick & Sentis, 1983). In his theory  of  social
comparison,  Festinger  (1954)  posited  that  people  are  inclined  to   appraise   themselves   with
objective information, for instance, their previous experiences with the event. If the information is
not available, they will seek other people (social information) as reference for comparison. In  this
regard, social comparison exerts an auxiliary function in the evaluation process. Given  rarity  and
importance are the  core  predictors  of  perception  of  luck  (Pritchard  &  Smith,  2004;  Rescher,
1995), exclusivity may serve as an interacting factor in predicting perception of luck.
The theory of social comparison also postulates that people prefer comparing with  others
who have a similar ability or opinion in  order  to  make  a  more  stable  and  accurate  evaluation
(Festinger, 1954; Radloff, 1966; Wilson, 1973). Goethals and Darley (1977) further  extended  the
postulation and proposed that people tend to compare with others who have similar attributes such
as age and experience (Taylor & Lobel, 1989). These arguments suggest that  people  would  form
their own pool of comparison  targets  based  on  their  discretion.  Although  the  original  idea  of
social comparison theory only accounts for people’s ability (i.e.,  skill),  the  theory  also  provides
implications for study on luck. For instance, to evaluate a personal luck  status,  a  gambler  would
compare his/her outcome with  several  others  who  fall  into  his/her  own  discretion  rather  than
everybody  in  the  casino.  Given   the   availability   heuristic   (Tversky   &   Kahneman,   1973),
counterparts playing at the same table or companions may be more salient in the gambler’s mind.
In general, this study proposes that perceived exclusivity of  the  casino  gaming  outcome
positively predicts perception of luck (Proposition 3).
Proximity
Counterfactual thinking is a pervasive social-cognitive function in human beings (Sanna &
Turley, 1996). The notion refers to the evaluation of a factual outcome with an imagined  outcome
(Epstude  &  Roese,  2008;  Roese,  2000;  Roese  &  Olson,  2006).  Teigen  (1995)   argued   that
counterfactual probability exerts a stronger impact on perception of luck  than  factual  probability
does. Although  prior  studies  showed  that  counterfactual  thinking  is  a  spontaneous  cognitive
process  (Markman,  Gavanski,  Sherman,  &  McMullen,  1993;  Sanna  &  Turley,  1996),   there
appears to be a lack of study showing that counterfactual thinking is evoked in every evaluation of
outcome. Indeed, McConnell et al. (2000), by means of experimental design,  found  that  72%  of
participants evaluated the outcome by comparing it with counterfactual  alternatives.  That  means
28% of participants have not evoked any counterfactual thinking in the evaluation process.
While counterfactual thinking triggers perception of  luck,  the  degree  of  luck  should  be
determined by how easy an alternative outcome can be imagined at the post-event  stage  (Boles
& Messick, 1995). In  other  words,  its  degree  depends  on  the  adjacency  between  factual  and
counterfactual outcomes (Teigen & Jensen, 2011), which  this  study  describes  as  proximity.  So
proximity should positively predict perceived luck. For instance, Wohl and Enzle (2003)  revealed
that near loss (i.e., almost experienced a big  loss)  in  a  gambling  instance  (i.e.  a  high  level  of
proximity) strengthened  lucky  feeling  because  such  a  situation  facilitates  people  to  generate
counterfactual  thinking.  As  evocation  of  counterfactual  thinking   does   not   occur   in   every
evaluation of outcome, proximity, like the construct of exclusivity, also needs a  precondition  (i.e.
counterfactual thinking  is  triggered).  Hence,  proximity  may  serve  as  an  interacting  factor  in
predicting perception of luck.
Teigen (1996) proposed five conditions where proximity can affect  the  intensity  of  luck.
The conditions are not uncommon in a casino gambling  context.  The  first  condition  is  physical
distance. For example, a player of Wheel  of  Fortune  feels  luckier  when  the  wheel  lands  on  a
sector next to the Bankrupt sector than when the wheel lands on a sector far  from  Bankrupt.  The
second condition is a temporal order. For instance, a gambler who manages to recoup  the  amount
lost at the beginning and eventually wins a  thousand  dollars  should  feel  luckier  than  the  same
gambler wins the same amount without any losing experiences before. It is because  the  outcomes
at a later stage are more likely to evoke counterfactual outcomes than those at  early  stage  (Miller
& Gunasegaram, 1990). The third condition is choice. A gambler who opts to bet one  more  game
before leaving the casino and wins money should feel luckier than in the situation when  the  same
gambler does  not  have  any  intention  to  leave.  The  fourth  condition  is  reality.  An  underage
gambler who wins the jackpot but is forbidden to claim the amount by law  should  feel  unluckier
than the same gambler loses all the money to the slot machine. The last factor  is  undeservedness.
For instance, a gambler, who has no intention  to  gamble,  is  invited  by  a  friend  to  play  a  slot
machine. Eventually, the gambler wins  the  jackpot  and  his  friend  loses  money.  That  gambler
should feel luckier than in the situation that the  gamble  is  initiated  by  him/herself.  Aside  from
these  five  conditions,  proximity  can  also  be  influenced  by  temporal  and  numerical  distance
(Roese, 1997). Regarding temporal distance, for instance, a slot machine player who  notifies  that
someone wins a jackpot at the same machine that he  played  a  few  minutes  ago  feels  unluckier
than when someone has a jackpot comes a week later. For  numerical  distance,  the  1001st  patron
should  feel  unluckier  than  the  1099th  patron  when  an   entrance   prize   is   dedicated   to   the
1000th patron.
In general, this study proposes that  perceived  proximity  of  the  casino  gaming  outcome
positively predicts perception of luck (Proposition 4).
METHODOLOGY
Participants and Procedures
        This study will conduct a survey with people who had casino gaming experience in Macao in
the past twelve months. The reason for employing twelve months is that the  period  is  within  the
recall ability of casino patrons (Richard, 1997). Interviewers will intercept potential participants at
the New Port Area of Macao as  two-thirds  of  casinos  are  located  within  and  nearby  the  area.
Systematic sampling procedures will be pursued so that  every  nth  number  (randomly  drawn)  of
people passing by the interviewers will be invited to participate in the study (Ghauri &  Gronhaug,
2002). Given that the population size in this study cannot be  specified,  Veal  (2006)  suggested  a
minimum sample size of 384 for a 5% margin of error. This study will recruit 400 samples.
Measures and Analysis
This study will employ multiple regression analysis to analyze the data. The sample size in
this study should be large enough for using regression analysis (e.g., a minimum sample  of  15  to
20 per independent variable) (Hair, Black, Babin, &  Anderson,  2010).  At  the  beginning  of  the
questionnaire, participants are asked to indicate whether they win or  lose.  All  constructs,  except
perception  of  luck,  will  be  measured  with  seven-point  semantic  differential   scale.   For   the
construct of rarity, 11 items will be  adapted  from  Wallsten,  Fillenbaum  and  Cox’s  (1986)  and
Mosteller and Youtz’s (1990) studies. Two expressions “possible” and “sometimes” are  excluded
since they are too neutral to precisely indicate subjective  probability  meanings  (Wallsten,  et  al.,
1986). To measure the constructs of importance,  this  study  will  borrow  Zaichkowsky’s  (1985)
scale of involvement (namely Personal  Involvement  Inventory  with  20  items)  considering  that
Howard and Sheth (1969) used the terms importance and involvement interchangeably. Regarding
exclusivity, the measurement items (3 items)  will  be  adapted  from  Barone  and  Roy’s  (2010a,
2010b) studies. For proximity, following Teigen’s (1998a) method, participants  will  be  asked  to
indicate their responses ranged from 1 (No, absolutely not) to 7 (Yes, definitely)  to  the  modified
question of “do you think a different outcome could  easily  have  happened”.  Perception  of  luck
will be measured with seven-point Likert-type scale  adapted  from  Andre’s  (2009)  subscales  of
good luck (3 items) and bad fortune (6 items). As discussed earlier,  outcome  valence  determines
luck valence. Hence, if participants’ gambling outcome is loss, all items in the perception  of  luck
scale  will  be  reversed.  Reliability  and  construct  validity  will  be  assessed   with   appropriate
statistical techniques. The assessments are crucial for this study  since  most  scales  are  borrowed
from other contexts (Hair, et al., 2010). Demographic information such as age, gender,  education,
country of origin, and  personal  monthly  income  will  be  collected  in  the  final  section  of  the
questionnaire.
EXPECTED OUTCOMES
This study  makes  attempt  to  establish  a  conceptual  model  of  perception  of  luck  and
empirically test the relationships between intensity of  luck  and  four  predictors  including  rarity,
importance, exclusivity and proximity in the  context  of  casino  gaming.  It  is  expected  that  the
findings will enrich theoretical understanding of luck. Furthermore, given that feeling of  luck  has
a significant impact on gamblers’ risk taking behavior, the findings  will  provide  implications  to
casino marketers on how to boost and shrink their patrons’ lucky and unlucky feeling respectively.
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